INTRODUCTION
Business churning is an important part of economic activity. Some firms are born while others fail, and some companies expand while others contract. New and superior ideas, processes, and goods replace obsolete ones in a dynamic process of "creative destruction."
1 Labor markets reflect that churning as some jobs are created while others are destroyed, and some workers move into new roles as others seek to replace them. 2 Though costly for some individual workers or firms in the short-term, this process contributes substantially to productivity growth overall as labor and capital are more efficiently allocated across the economy. 3 This makes the process of business-and labor-market churning indispensable because the resulting productivity gains help drive sustained economic growth.
A number of signs point to a secular decline in U.S. business dynamism, which goes far beyond the more recent effects of the Great Recession. 4 For example, the rate of new firm formation-a key element of business dynamism and new job creation-has been declining steadily for at least the last three decades. Job reallocation-the process that moves workers away from contracting or closing businesses and toward expanding or new firms-also has been declining over the same period.
We contribute to the understanding of the secular decline in business dynamism in the United States by examining how these trends apply to the innovative high-tech sectordefined as the group of industries with very high shares of workers in the STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and math (see Appendix A).
Despite its relatively small size-representing just 4.1 percent of total private-sector firms in 2011-the high-tech sector packs a lot of economic punch. Aside from the obvious productivity gains across the U.S. economy that are directly attributable to the adoption of high-tech goods and services, the high-tech sector itself is a key contributor to income generation, job creation, and productivity growth.
JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION
A standard approach to understanding business dynamism is to examine the job flows associated with this process during a given period of time. Figure 1 shows annual job creation and destruction rates for the high-tech sector between 1978 and 2011 using the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. 6 Because these data are based on annual snapshots of U.S. businesses over time, annual job creation reflects a net addition of employment at a particular business through one of two channels-the expansion of employment at an existing business establishment or the birth of a new one in a particular year. Job destruction reflects a net loss of employment-when an existing business either contracts employment or closes its doors.
As Figure 1 shows, the rate of both job creation and destruction in the high-tech sector were elevated in each year. The high-tech boom in the second half of the 1990s is evident, with a high pace of job creation and a slightly increasing rate of job destruction during this period. The spike in job destruction in the March 2001 to March 2002 period is associated with the well-known dot-com bust. Of particular interest for the current analysis is the slowdown in the overall pace of job creation and destruction in the post-2002 period. This slowdown is evident in the declining trends of both job creation and job destruction from about 2004 onward. The drop in both gross job creation and net job creation has been especially pronounced in the wake of the Great Recession.
To compare the patterns for the high-tech sector to the private sector as a whole, a summary measure of economic dynamism is used: the job reallocation rate. The latter measures the sum of job creation and destruction rates in a given year, providing an integrated view of business dynamism. Here, we focus on trend rates rather than the actual rates themselves. As Figure 2 shows, job reallocation in the entire private sector has been on a sharp and steady trend decline for the last few decades, while the high-tech sector exhibited a trend increase in the pace of reallocation until about 2002. However, since 2002 there has been a sharp trend decline in high-tech sector job reallocation that has even exceeded the pace of the decline in the overall economy. So, interestingly, the high-tech sector bucked the national trend by exhibiting rising dynamism until 2002-but even it has exhibited a trend decline since 2002.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES
A key player in the process of creative destruction and business dynamism is the entrepreneurial firm, which is measured here by firm age-in particular, new and young firms (those aged five years or younger). Previous research has firmly established that these businesses play a central role in productivity gains and employment growth. While mature firms are responsible for the majority of employment levels (static), it is new and young firms that make disproportionately large contributions to net new jobs (dynamic) overall. 8 A recent Engine-Kauffman Foundation report analyzed firm formation and job creation in the high-tech sector, extending the existing research to this innovation-driven segment of the economy. 9 It found that the high-tech sector has produced an outsized share of entrepreneurship and job creation during the last few decades, and has been spreading throughout the country. 10 Even among job-creating young firms, surviving young high-tech businesses add jobs at a rate twice that of all surviving young firms, and the rate of job creation is so robust that it offsets losses from early-stage failures-something that is not true for young firms as a whole.
11 In short, firms aged five or younger are key drivers of new job creation, a fact that is especially true in high-tech. Sustaining a robust rate of net new job creation requires a constant supply of firm births each year. Looking at the absolute number of new and young firms can help us identify relevant trends and inflection points affecting entrepreneurship. However, it does little to help us understand the context in which these patterns take place. A more relevant statistic in this regard is the entrepreneurship rate, which tells us the relative importance young firms have in a sector. However, the decline has not been monotonic, with a rise in the entrepreneurship rate in the second half of the 1990s, which was followed by the dot-com bust. Perhaps even more relevant is the continued decline in the entrepreneurship rate in the post-2002 period. The latter occurs at a pace that even exceeds the decline in entrepreneurship for the private sector as a whole during the same period.
CONCLUSION
In the post-2000 period, the high-tech sector is experiencing a process of economic activity consolidation, away from young firms and into more mature firms. The high-tech sector looked different than the rest of the private economy did during the 1990s, when the share of young firms was declining in the overall economy but rising in high-tech. In the early 2000s, entrepreneurial activity in the high-tech sector began declining sharply during what is well-known as the dot-com bust.
Less well known is that the share of young firms in the high-tech sector has exhibited a more pronounced secular decline in the post-2002 period than in the rest of the economy. Consistent with that pattern, we have found that the pace of business dynamism, as measured by the pace of job reallocation, has declined in the high-tech sector in the post-2002 period at a pace that exceeds that of the overall economy.
Empirical evidence suggests a link between business dynamism, innovation, and productivity growth. In this regard, the findings here point to the possibility of a slowdown in productivity and economic growth in the high-tech sector in the last decade. The slowdown we find for the high-tech sector might be an even larger source of concern than that for the overall economy, since young high-tech firms may be more important for innovation and new job creation than their non-high-tech counterparts are.
APPENDIX A: DEFINING HIGH-TECH
According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study published in 2005 that followed an interagency seminar aimed at classifying high-tech industries, a high-tech industry is defined by the presence of four factors: a high proportion of scientists, engineers, and technicians; a high proportion of R&D employment; production of high-tech products, as specified on a Census Bureau list of advanced-technology products; and the use of high-tech production methods, including intense use of high-tech capital goods and services in the production process.
14 The study also concluded that because of "data and conceptual problems," the intensity of "science, engineering, and technician" employment would be the basis for identifying high-tech industries. Seventy-six "technology-oriented occupations" were used to conduct the employment intensity analysis. A condensed list is outlined in Table 1 , but broadly speaking, these occupations coalesce around three groups-computer and math scientists; engineers, drafters and surveyors; and physical and life scientists. After this group of occupations was identified, an intensity analysis was conducted to determine which industries contained large shares of these technology-oriented workers. Of the more than 300 industries at the level of granularity used, the fourteen shown in Table 2 had the highest concentrations of technology-oriented workers. Each of these fourteen "Level-1" industries had concentrations of high-tech employment at least five times the average across industries. This report uses the method described above to define the high-tech sector of the U.S. economy. Checks were made to ensure that the identifying conditions held in the latest available data, and crosswalks were performed to account for changes in industry and occupation classifications over time. Though the Bureau of Labor Statistics report ultimately concluded that a wider group of industries could be considered high-tech, this report uses a more conservative approach by analyzing just the fourteen Level-1 industries with very high concentrations of technology-oriented workers in the STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and math.
16

